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Abstract 
This study is based on Kama’s (2009) research on the difference between the market reactions to 
revenue surprise compared to earnings surprise. In addition, we analyse the effect of corporate 
governance on these results. We show that earnings surprise has a more significant effect on 
market reactions than revenue surprise. Furthermore, the market reacts more to earnings 
information when companies have good corporate governance as measured by analyst following. 
Interestingly, the market reacts stronger to revenue surprise than earnings surprise in high R&D 
intensity companies. 
 
 
Keywords:  market reaction; earnings surprise; revenue surprise; market capitalization; R&D 
intensity; corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Numerous studies focus on interpreting why the market reacts more strongly to revenue surprise 
rather than expense surprise. Kama (2009) shows that the dominating power of earnings surprise 
of revenue surprise has decayed over the year, and revenue surprise has become more pronounced 
especially for high R&D intensity firms in their fourth fiscal quarter that operate in oligopolistic 
competition. Following Kama’s idea, we first show that stock price surprise significantly 
responds to both the revenue surprise and earnings surprise. Similar to Kama, we find that for 
high R&D intensity companies, the market reacts more to revenue surprise than earnings surprise. 
We then try to deepen our research and analyse the effect of corporate governance on the earnings 
response coefficient of earnings surprise and revenue surprise. We hypothesize that good 
corporate governance will prevent earnings manipulation and make earnings information more 
reliable. To measure the effect of corporate governance, we consider two relatively intuitive 
proxies: market capitalizations and number of analysts.  
 
Such interpretations provide useful information about the relative importance of revenue and 
earnings information. The analysis contributes to institutional investors’ strategic decision- 
making as well as individual investors’ active portfolio management.  
 
Our intention is to see whether earnings surprise and revenue surprise are both significant 
explanatory variables to stock return surprise through running several different liner regressions. 
We also add interaction terms into our regression model to analyse the marginal effect of R&D 
intensity and corporate governance practice on the earnings and revenue surprise. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
More and more researchers are exploring the market reactions to earnings surprise, revenue 
surprise and expense surprise around announcement date. These researches have extended the 
theories of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) that market reactions to information on 
different disclosed financial measurements are reflected by fluctuation in stock returns. Earnings 
and revenue can have difference in their signalling effect on valuation. For example, Porter 
(1985) puts forward that revenue growth is a more effective way than cost reduction to ensure 
sustainable earning growth. Swaminathan and Weintrop (1991) find that the stock prices fluctuate 
more to changes in revenue rather than to expenses on per dollar basis. Philip G.Berger (2003) 
points out that there will be a negative impact on the stock price change if the effect of a growth 
company cost reduction (expense changes) exceed that of revenue increase. Yonca ertimur and 
Joshua Livnat (2003) also expand Swaminathan and Weintrop’s (1991) research by grouping the 
full samples of firms into value companies and growth companies and then they compare the 
different market reactions to revenue surprise and expenses surprise. Compared with value 
companies’ investors, their results show that those investing in growth companies react more 
strongly to revenue surprise. Many experts study the reasons and they use revenue persistency, 
earning management, accounting manipulation and homogeneity of revenue to explain Yonca 
ertimur and Joshua Livnat’s results.  
 
With respect to market reaction, Kama (2009) employs earnings surprise to replace expense 
surprise used by other researchers as variables and proves the domination of earnings surprise 
over revenue surprise. Kama (2009) employs contextual analysis method and concludes that the 
dominating power of earnings surprise diminishes especially for companies in oligopolistic 
competitions, in the fourth fiscal quarter and in R&D intensive industries. Since oligopolistic 
companies are distinguished by having a large market share which is highly related to their 
revenue generating abilities and companies lean on window dressing especially near the year end, 
revenue become a more trustworthy indicator for market assessment. Kothari et al. (2002) earlier 
finds that the higher R&D expense, the more volatile the company’s earnings is. Therefore, the 
market tends to give more weight to revenue surprise as an indicator for evaluating the reliability 
of company performance. In our paper, we will show that in terms of market reaction (stock price 
surprise), earnings surprise has dominating power over revenue surprise. However, under specific 
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circumstances, for example, in high R&D intensive companies, earnings surprise power is less 
important than revenue surprise. 
 
We also extend Kama’s (2009) research on market reaction to earnings surprise and revenue 
surprise by taking corporate governance into consideration and using market capitalizations and 
number of analysts as governance proxies. Researches indicate that good corporate governance 
environment benefits the market pricing and analyst forecasts. Yu (2011) pointed out that there is 
a positive relationship between stock price informativeness and corporate governance. Barniv, 
Myring, and Thomas (2005) also stressed the importance of good corporate governance for 
analysts to realize their abilities. To make the corporate governance indicator measureable and 
quantitative, we assume in our paper that companies with large market capitalization are those 
that attract large number of analysts and market scrutiny so they tend to have strong corporate 
governance level. We conjecture that earnings surprise becomes more significant than revenue 
surprise when companies have good corporate governance.   
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3. Sample, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The raw data used to run the regressions for all public companies are attained from IBES, CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT database for the period January 1st, 1990- December 31st, 2015. Since the 
analysts’ forecasts for financial variables are updated on monthly basis, we choose the closest 
consensus forecast date to the actual announcement date as the reference to look up the 
corresponding forecast EPS and forecast revenue. Here revenue is on per share basis. Three 
surprise terms are generated through the following formulas and those with empty values have 
been dropped.  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎|EPS𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎|   
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) = 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎|Revenue𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎|  
 
Market reactions are represented by two-day return through compounding daily abnormal return 
(AR) which are chosen from announcement date (T0) to the day after (T1). All the surprise terms 
are calculated in percentage format. 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 = 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 − 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅2𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆) = (1 + 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇0) ∗ (1 + 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇1) − 1 
 
We first run the following simple liner regression model to see whether both𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2 are 
significantly different from zero at 95% or 99% confidence level and whether𝛽𝛽1 >  𝛽𝛽2. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
We further try to prove Kama’s (2009) theory that for high R&D intensity companies, the 
dominating power of earnings surprise diminishes and the market inclines to rely on revenue 
surprise. High R&D intensity companies are defined by those with RDI exceeds 1.49 (near 95th 
percentile). We run similar regression with a dummy variable DHRD being introduced. 
𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼 (𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼) = 𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒
   
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 + 𝛽𝛽 1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
10 
 
Following the above regression method, we regress TDR with two dummy variables DLCAP (large 
market capitalization) and DLNUM (large number of analysts), SUE, SUR and their interaction 
terms. We also place a comparative group that replaces DLCAP and DLNUM with DSCAP and DSNUM. 
In our paper, companies with more than 2 billion market capitalization are defined as large cap 
companies (DLCAP) and those with less than 50 million are small cap companies (DSCAP). 
Companies with more than 10 analysts (75th percentile) are subsamples for DLNUM and those with 
only 1 analyst are subsamples for DSNUM. With hypothesize that with good corporate governance, 
market participants will respond more strongly to earnings information than revenue information. 
Besides, we regress TDR with all dummy variables related to corporate governance measurement, 
SUR and SUE in the following form: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 +   𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽6 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for variables in full sample (Panel A) and R&D intensity 
sample (Panel B). The mean and median of TDR in both cases are zero in Panel A. If we compare 
the number TDR within the four different percentiles, it shows that TDR almost conforms to 
standard normal distribution. However, the mean of SUE and SUR are negative and less than its 
respective median, indicating that both SUR and SUR are left skewed. Therefore, we eliminate 
the effects of extreme values of SUE and SUR by winsorizing the extreme 1% observation on 
both sides.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Contextual Analysis 
To study whether market reacts differently to earnings and revenue surprise based on certain 
characteristics, we use market capitalization, number of analyst estimates and R&D intensity as 
specifications in regression analysis. The dependant variable is two-day cumulative return (TDR).  
The independent variables are SUE (surprise in earnings) and SUR with dummy variables DLCAP, 
DSCAP, DLNUM, DSNUM and DHRD. Table 2.1 demonstrates simple liner regression of SUE and SUR 
and T- test of difference between the means. Table 2.2 presents regression results with individual 
dummy variables. Table 3 presents combined dummies – market cap and number of analysts. 
Table 4 looks at R&D intensity. 
 
4.1.1 Market Capitalization 
Specification 1 includes only SUE and SUS. Similar with Kama (2009), both coefficients SUE 
(19.52) and SUR (18.77) are positive and significant at 1% level. SUE is larger than SUR, 
particularly after adding firm-fixed effect (20.79 and 12.14). The difference between mean SUE 
and mean SUR is significant (see Table 2.1). A larger coefficient of SUE means SUE is major 
explanatory variable for TDR. Two-day market return is highly sensitive to changes in earnings. 
This result suggests that market reacts more to earnings surprise than revenue surprise in most 
instances.
 
 
Specification 2 adds log market capitalization L(MKT). Figures show that earnings surprise has 
the only significant coefficient in explaining stock surprise, while revenue surprise is not 
significant. Coefficients for revenue surprise are positive and significant at 1% level in all other 
specifications. 
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Specification 3 includes dummy variable DLCAP for companies with large capitalization. The 
coefficient of SUE is slightly larger on its own. Yet, interaction term DLCAP * SUE (-5.17) shows 
significantly decreasing effects of earnings surprise. Overall coefficient of SUE (14.68) is lower 
than SUR (19.12). This result indicates that for large-cap firms in general, market is more 
sensitive to surprise in revenue. Ghosh et al. (2005) argues that, revenues are valued more 
because they indicate earnings persistence and future operating performance. However, at 
individual firm level, SUE (15.86) holds higher coefficient than SUR (12.24). We interpret this as 
market emphasis on firm’s profitability. 
 
Specification 4 includes dummy variable DSCAP for companies with small capitalization. 
Interaction terms are not significant, which may result from small number of observations 
(3,879). SUE coefficients are larger than SUR, consistent with findings in specification 1. Yet the 
SUE coefficients are smaller than those in specification 2 L(MKT), indicating a less explanatory 
power of earnings surprise for small-cap firms.   
 
4.1.2 Number of Analyst Estimate 
After examining market capitalization, we turn to test effects of number of analyst estimates. 
L(NOA) is added in specification 5. Interaction terms L(NOA) * SUE incrementally increases 
explanatory power of earnings surprise. 
 
Specification 6 examines firms with more than 10 analyst estimates. Firms with more analyst 
estimates are usually larger in size (0.54 correlation with large-cap firms). These firms are also 
more likely to have better corporate governance, less earnings management. We find that 
coefficient of SUE (28.45) is much higher than SUR (18.64). We conclude that better corporate 
governance increases importance and credibility for earnings.   
 
Specification 7 examines firms with only 1 analyst estimates. Firm in this group tends to be small 
(correlation of 0.34 with small-cap firms). Coefficients for SUE are (12.65 or 14.12) smaller than 
SUR (20.48 or 15.71) in general or at firm level. These figures indicate that when information is 
scarce, revenue surprises are valued more by market.  
14 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Combined Variables 
When combining large-cap with large number of analyst estimates, table 3 shows reinforcing 
explanatory power of earnings surprise. Specification 8 includes L(MKT) and L(NOA). Both 
confidence level and coefficient value are larger for SUE.  Specification 9 examines firms that 
fall in the intersection of large-cap and large-number of analyst estimates. Explanatory power in 
SUE is significantly increased by DLNUM, and decreased by DLCAP. Coefficient for SUE (24.07) is 
larger than SUR (18.96). At firm level the gap increased—SUE (23.82) versus SUR (11.80). The 
larger influence of earnings surprise mainly come from number of analyst variable. 
 
Specification 10 examines firms that fall in the intersection of small-cap and small-number of 
analyst estimates. As expected, results are the opposite of specification 9. Explanatory power of 
SUE is significantly decreased by DSNUM, and increased by DSCAP. Coefficient for SUE (16.24) is 
smaller than SUR (19.88). At firm level the gap widened—SUE (12.06) versus SUR (16.02). 
15 
 
 
 
4.1.4 Summary 
The conclusion from Table 2 and 3 is that, earnings surprise commonly explains more of market 
reaction than revenue surprise. Coefficient for SUE (SUR) is more (less) sensitive to interactions 
with dummy variables. Number of analyst estimate demonstrates more significant and larger 
influence over SUE than market capitalization. Both DLCAP and DSNUM significantly decrease 
explanatory power of SUE, with different reasons. The former is because market places 
incrementally increasing attention on earning persistence and future performance for large-cap 
firms. Those two characteristics are implied in revenue, not earnings. The latter is due to 
information scarcity. Market attention moves towards revenue when perceived earning precision 
is low.  
 
DLNUM increases the effect of SUE on stock surprise, particularly when combined with DLCAP. The 
least strong dummy variable is DSCAP. It increases explanatory power of SUE at 5% significance 
level only when combined with DSNUM. The lack of significance may originate from few 
observations (3,879 and 8,772 respectively).   
16 
 
4.2 R&D Intensity Analysis 
Table 4 presents R&D intensity analysis. Specification 1 includes variable SUE, SUR and RDI. 
Coefficients for SUE are positive and significant, explains more of TDR similar with results in 
specification 1 in Table 2.  
 
Specification 2 adds dummy variable DHRD as firms with high R&D intensity. Interaction term 
reduces effect of SUE significantly at 1% level (DHRD * SUE coefficient of -21.13), making SUR 
(21.97) the dominant factor for stock surprise. This indicates that, in general when R&D expense 
to sales ratio is high, market perceives riskiness in its earnings and values more of signal given by 
sales.  After adding firm-fixed effect, interaction term loses significance, SUE retains significant 
and higher coefficient 25.37 than SUR (18.15).  This suggests that at individual firm level, market 
values growth potential embedded in high R&D intensity, and grants tolerance to less satisfactory 
sales performance so long as the firm demonstrates promising earning capability.   
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5. Conclusion 
This study is focused on examining whether and when one of the two announcement surprises 
(earnings and revenue) has a larger effect on stock surprise. Our aim is to show that the different 
explanatory power of earnings and revenue surprise to market surprise depends on some firm 
characteristics. 
 
Consistent with Kama (2009), we find that in general, earning surprise has larger effect on market 
reaction than revenue surprise. Based on the assumption that market value and number of analyst 
coverage are indicators of organizational governance, we test whether market reacts less to 
earnings surprise when firms have weaker organizational governance. The idea is that the 
earnings news is less informative than the revenue news when the firms have weaker governance; 
while it is relatively easy to change the earnings figures, it is hard to do so for the sales figures. 
We proxy for governance with the variable number of analysts, where the interaction terms of 
number of analysts with SUE is negative. While we find that number of analysts seem to have 
effect on the market reaction to SUE, market capitalization does not give strong support for our 
hypothesis on governance. Explanatory power of earnings surprises is incrementally decreasing 
for large-cap firms, while behaviors of two surprises are not significantly different from overall 
sample for small-cap firms. Similar with what Kama (2009) has found, companies with high 
R&D to revenue ratio can have relatively lower explanatory power of SUE on market reaction, 
partly explained by its high earning volatility and requirement of sales as indicator of 
performance. Our study begins with results supporting the statement that earnings surprise 
generally has larger impact on stock surprise, as suggested in relevant literatures. The study then 
further examines difference in explanatory power of earnings and revenue surprise, depending on 
contextual factors including market capitalization, number of analyst estimates and R&D 
intensity. 
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